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Abstract
We develop an economic model of association based on voluntary contributions. Differ-
ent equilibria corresponding to the different modes of formation of associations are ana-
lyzed and the results are compared with existing empirical literature. The main contribu-
tion consists in formalizing the voluntary association as a means of providing collective-
consumption goods or services. We introduce the concept of the subjective quality as a
possible incentive for volunteering. The model stresses the importance of non-pecuniary
rewards and of accepted differentiation for well-functioning of voluntary organizations.
Key words: Voluntary Association, Public Good, Volunteering.
JEL classification: H41, L30, L31.
1 Introduction
The voluntary sector is considered as an extra-governmental provider of collective
consumption goods representing an alternative for unsatisfied demanders (Weis-
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brod, 1977, 1986.) It can be distinguished from the public and the private sectors
by its means of providing goods and services. The public provision of goods or
services is financed by compulsory taxes, while on the market individuals have to
pay their consumption. With voluntary provision, on the other hand, individuals
can choose to contribute to the provision of a good or service, whether they con-
sume it or not (Sugden, 1984.) In this paper, we investigate the aspect of voluntary
nonprofit organizations that involves individual commitment to the voluntary asso-
ciation.
Voluntary monetary contributions and voluntary work constitute important (but not
the unique) resources for the functioning of associations. According to Havens et
al. (2006), in the United States, about 90 percent of American households donate
to nonprofits. In 2001, individual contributions accounted for 13.7 percent of the
total resources of American nonprofits, while public support represented 9.9 per-
cent (Tax Foundation, 2005.) Voluntary contributions are not necessarily monetary.
They can also be represented by contributions in effort or time. In 1993, for in-
stance, the value of voluntary work in the American nonprofits was estimated at
about 182 billion dollars.
The example of the voluntary sector illustrates the fact that although voluntary
contributions alone are often insufficient to make possible the provision of public
goods, they cannot be ignored by economists. According to standard public good
theory, the amount of the good provided through voluntary contributions will be
sub-optimal because of free-riding. In theory, when agents are considered as pure
altruists (Andreoni, 1989), i.e. when they are interested only in the total outcome
of the collective action, public support leads to the complete crowding-out of vol-
untary contributions. However, empirical studies show that voluntary contributions
are not completely crowded-out by public financial support. Moreover, in exper-
imental studies, complete free-riding is not observed. Experimental studies allow
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to distinguish between different determinants of voluntary contributions. Gener-
ally, these studies show that communication (for instance cheap-talk, negotiation
or promises) and the absence of anonymity tend to increase voluntary contributions
(Andreoni and Petrie, 2003.) Other social determinants, such as certain individ-
ual characteristics (Glaeser et al., 2000), cooperative values versus individualistic
values (Offermann et al., 1996), social environment (Carpenter et al., 2004) also
influence the provision of public goods. Clearly, the majority of experimental stud-
ies shed particular light on the influence of social factors in the provision of public
goods.
Empirical studies in the voluntary sector focus largely on the factors influencing
donors’ behavior. These factors include state support of the provision of public
goods, the total provision of public goods, the fund-rising expenditure of nonprof-
its and individual motivations. An interesting feature of the voluntary sector is that
governmental support of the public provision of public goods does not crowd-out
individual contributions. In some cases, one can even observe some crowding-in.
Okten and Weisbrod (2000) find no significant parameters of crowding-out in the
United States. Furthermore, they find that the area of higher education and research
presents some crowding-in effects (with parameters of 0.06 and 0.1 respectively).
In a study of international relief and development organizations, Ribar and Wilhelm
(2002) show that contributions to these organizations are only weakly affected by
public support, but they are positively influenced by fund-raising expenditure. In
experimental studies, the crowding-out is greater, but still incomplete. As Andreoni
suggested (1993), this is due to the intentional elimination of social factors in ex-
periments.
Another interesting feature is that voluntary organizations are recognized as being
capable of revealing demands and practising price discrimination, or personalized
prices (Hansmann, 1980; Ben-Ner, 1986.) The concept of Lindahl equilibria using
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personalized prices shows that if such a price system is established, then efficiency
can be attained in the provision of the public good. Ben-Ner (1986) pointed out
that social relationships between the members, the constraint of non-distribution
of benefits and the shared backgrounds of members all help nonprofits to establish
personalized prices.
In this paper, we develop a model of voluntary association. Firstly, we consider a
standard public good model where individuals can make voluntary monetary con-
tributions. We derive some interesting properties concerning overcrowding, incen-
tives, and the existence of different equilibria resulting from the different ways in
which association can emerge.
Secondly, the concept of subjective quality is introduced into the basic model. The
originality of the model is that we assume the public good to be characterized by
at least two main components, namely the quantity and the quality. The quantity is
considered here as a purely public component, insofar as all the members benefit
equally from it. However, the quality of the public good is considered as a mixed
(public and private) component. The agents can enjoy part of it in the same way,
but there may exist certain characteristics of quality that are difficult or impossi-
ble to measure objectively. In a way, quality is always somewhat subjective, to the
extent that perfect correspondence with the preferences of heterogeneous agents is
unlikely to occur. In our model, the agents can contribute money or time and effort.
The latter, or volunteering, allows them to influence the quality of the provided
good (or service) according to their own preferences. The aim of the model is to
formalize a set of assumptions about the functioning of voluntary organizations.
The properties we derive from it help to understand better the recurring issues of
nonprofit management and volunteering.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and the con-
ditions relating to overcrowding. Section 3 analyzes the individual and collective
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incentives to make voluntary contributions. Section 4 shows the existence of dif-
ferent symmetric equilibria. Section 5 shows the existence of non-symmetric equi-
libria both without and then with budget constraints. In section 6 we introduce
volunteering and the concept of subjective quality. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
The model presented in this section is an extension of a standard public good model.
We consider a set of n agents i = 1 . . .N, with N > 1, who are members of an
association. The number of members must be higher than one, by definition of
an association. Each agent is endowed with an income wi, which can be used for
private consumption and for the provision of a public good G. All the members have
to pay a compulsory amount c, on top of which each member can add a voluntary
pecuniary contribution di in order to increase production of the public good. At this
stage, the utility function of each agent can be written as follows:
UiG = wi− c−di+ θNγ (Nc+
N
∑
j=1
d j +X)α , (1)
0 < α < 1, 0≤ γ ≤ 1,
The variable X has a double economic meaning. A positive value is interpreted as a
fixed amount of monetary resources coming from exogenous origins (public grants,
for instance.) A negative X describes the net amount of fixed costs (fixed costs less
exogenous resources).
The parameters α and θ describe the production technology of the public good con-
tributing to the individual utility, in the non-linear and linear forms respectively.
The parameter α can be interpreted in terms of more or less important decreas-
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ing returns. The parameter θ is always positive, because contributing to the good
is assumed to generate a positive externality. The introduction of this parameter
allows to vary the attractiveness of the good. In fact, as has been noted in some
experimental studies, the attractiveness of a public good can positively influence
individual voluntary contributions to it (Hichri, 2004.)
The parameter γ denotes the publicness of the provided good by measuring its de-
gree of rivalry (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Blecha, 1987). A γ tending towards
zero corresponds to decreasing rivalry of the public good. At one extreme, γ equal
to zero describes the case of a collective-consumption good in the sense of Samuel-
son (1954). This good is completely non-rival and its consumption by one agent
does not prevent others from consuming it. Think for instance of an environmental
association campaigning against pollution, or an association fighting a disease. In
these cases, each member benefits from the totality of the results of the collective
action. On the contrary, a γ equal to 1 describes a completely rival good, equiv-
alent to a collectively provided private good equally shared among the members.
As an illustration, this type of function may correspond to the running of housing
cooperatives, fairly wide-spread nonprofit organizations in countries like Canada
or Switzerland.
2.1 The Issue of Overcrowding
In our model, overcrowding may appear under some conditions. Actually, the share
obtained by the agent i will depend on N and on the sharing rule characterized by
γ . The overcrowding effects appear when the individual benefit for i from the good
provided diminishes as the number of members grows.
The case of γ equal to zero implies the absence of overcrowding, insofar as it de-
scribes a pure public good (Samuelson, 1954). To understand overcrowding effects
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when γ is strictly positive, we study the variations of the production function (2)
with the number of members N.
f (N) =
1
Nγ
(Nc+
N
∑
j=1
d j +X)α , (2)
Proposition 1 In the absence of fixed costs (namely when X ≥ 0) there is no over-
crowding. More precisely:
• if γ ≥ α , association has no sense as the sharing rule cancels the marginal gain
expected from any individual contribution.
• if γ < α , there exists a threshold N1 beyond which any additional contribution
increases individual utility.
Proposition 2 In the presence of fixed costs, (namely if X < 0) there can exist an
overcrowding when γ > α . More precisely:
• if γ ≤ α , there exists a threshold N0 beyond which any additional individual
contribution increases individual utility;
• if γ > α an association makes sense only for the population size N ∈ [N0,N1].
Beyond the threshold N1 there is overcrowding (see proof in Appendix A).
Proofs are presented in Appendix A. We begin by assuming symmetrical voluntary
contributions. Then we study the sign of the production function with respect to N
in different configurations (fixed costs versus exogenous ressources). To summa-
rize, the sign of the derivatives of the production function varies as follows:
Table 1
The size of the association and overcrowding
N N0 =−Xc′ N1 =− γX(γ−α)c′
d f
dN Unde f ined > 0 0 < 0
Association Overcrowding
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At this stage, propositions 1 and 2 can be summarized in table 2.
Table 2
Overcrowding
Cases X > 0 X < 0
γ < α No overcrowding No overcrowding
γ > α Association makes no sense Overcrowding
Then we extend the scope of the results by considering the internal dynamics of
the association. Olson (1971) has already stressed the role of the internal structure
of associations, and in particular its impact on the group’s capacity to organize
the provision of public goods. These internal structures can bring some formal or
informal coordination to the process of providing the public good or organizing a
collective action. An informal coalition can be created by individuals who decide
to provide the public good even if they have to support the total cost, or at least
a higher cost than the others. According to Olson, such coalitions can be formed
in relatively large groups. In this case, the public good may be provided even in
non-structured groups, as some participants may be able to provide the public good
to the entire group.
In a first extension, we demonstrate that the results hold when K first members,
founders for instance, each make a fixed voluntary contribution while newcomers
(i > K) only contribute the compulsory amount c.
Then we allow the possibility for i > K members to make a positive voluntary
contribution, by letting voluntary contributions vary for any i ≤ K. We show that
the general case results hold with these new extensions.
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3 Incentives
For the rest of the paper we now consider X ≥ 0 and γ <α . The question we address
now concerns individual and collective incentives in relation to the size of the asso-
ciation. This size can influence the incentives for agents to contribute individually
or collectively, in a coordinated manner, via its effects on individual and collective
returns. The attractiveness of the public good can depend on the number of persons
sharing it. So what we are interested in here is the marginal return on the voluntary
contribution of an Nth newcomer. We compare the conditions of a positive return
to those of a group of N individuals who decided jointly to contribute. The positive
return of a newcomer represents an ”individual incentive” to contribute, while the
collective return constitutes a ”collective incentive” to form a coalition of ”volun-
teers”.
Proposition 3 The individual incentive to contribute is at least N times weaker
than the collective incentive. The individual incentive assumes that:
θα ≥ Nγ(Nc+
N−1
∑
j=1
d j +X)1−α . (3)
Thus, it diminishes with N.
The collective incentive assumes that:
θα ≥ (Nc+X)
1−α
N1−γ
. (4)
Thus it increases with N until
N ≤ 1− γ
γ
X
c
(5)
and then it diminishes.
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For proof see Appendix B.
Example As a simple illustration, let us take the case where X = 0 and ∑di =
0. By substituting this in (3) and (4), we obtain the conditions for the individual
incentives:
N ≤ (θα)
1
1−α
c
,
and for the collective incentives:
N ≥ (c
1−α
θα
)
1
α
The figure below shows how the number of participants N varies with the amount
of c due, for given parameters θ and α .
Fig. 1. Illustration: N as a function of c
(a) θ = 1,α = 0.5 (b) θ = 1,α = 0.8
The curves of individual incentives presented in graphs (a) and (b) indicate the size
N of the association, below which members have incentives to provide voluntary
contributions individually. Comparison of the two graphs reveals the effect of the
production technology of the public good on the incentives. The maximum size of
the association below which the members have incentives to contribute individually
is ceteris paribus higher when the production technology is less effective. Equiva-
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lently, the size above which the members have incentives to form a coalition inside
the association is ceteris paribus larger when the technological parameter is low.
Corollary 3.1 To each size N of voluntary association corresponds an optimal
level of fee c∗(N,X ,α,γ). In addition, this level increases with N, the number of
members.
Proof is given in Appendix B.
4 Symmetric Equilibria
In this section, we consider the different equilibria corresponding to different modal-
ities of formation of an association. Depending on these modes of emergence of
association, the members can decide together to contribute an equal amount, or
some members can form a coalition of volunteers. Some prior conditions may in-
fluence the process of formation of an association, for instance the heterogeneity in
members’ incomes. Sociologists (Laville and Sainsaulieu, 1997) make a distinction
between at least two main modes of formation of associations, depending on the
position of the founders with regard to the action undertaken: - ”for self” and ”for
others”. In the first case, the members self-organize with no distinction between
a dominant category of active members and beneficiaries. In the organization ”for
others”, on the contrary, there is a differentiation a priori between so-called ”weak”
and ”strong” categories of agents (Laville and Sainsaulieu, 1997, p. 288.)
These modes of emergence affect the internal functioning of the organization. In
associations whose members are not the direct beneficiaries, it is common to ob-
serve some detachment of ”weak” categories from the ”strong” actors. In this kind
of organization, the mobilization of passive beneficiaries becomes an important is-
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sue for management. In self-organized associations, on the contrary, the difficulty
consists in reaching a consensus between the ”strong actors” and pursuing the joint
action in a sustained manner (Laville and Sainsaulieu, 1997, p. 290).
In the model proposed here, these situations are considered using the concepts of
different equilibria. The N-symmetric equilibrium can be considered as the most
socially desired result, in that it implies equal contributions from each member. It
corresponds to the case of an association where all the participants belong to the
same category of actors.
However, as Olson (1971) noted, an internal coalition can be formed, whose mem-
bers make additional voluntary contributions. This situation can correspond to the
case of the association ”for others”, with a distinction between ”strong” and ”weak”
categories of participants. This kind of association is studied using the concept of
K-symmetric equilibrium. Finally, introducing a budget constraint allows us to an-
alyze the partial K-symmetric equilibrium. In this case, the members belonging to
the coalition of volunteers can each make an equal voluntary contribution, while
members whose incomes do not allow them to contribute at the same level con-
tribute less.
4.1 N-symmetric equilibrium
In the utility function without budget constraint, there is no particular reason for any
asymmetry in the amount of voluntary contributions. In the case of N-symmetric
equilibrium, the voluntary contribution di = d ∀i ∈ N is equivalent to a voluntary
increase in dues, raising them from c to c′ = c+d.
Proposition 4 Without budget constraint, there exists a unique N-symmetric equi-
librium of the voluntary contribution d∗ whose value is increasing in N, θ , and α
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and decreasing in c and X.
Proof is given in Appendix C.
Example Sign of d∗. Let us not restrict the sign for the voluntary contribution. A
negative contribution is therefore equivalent to a reduction in dues. A positive value
is equivalent to an increase in dues. To illustrate this, take a case where θ = 1, γ = 0,
and α = 0.5. Replacing these parameters in (C.3), we study the conditions making
d∗ equal to zero:
d∗ =
1
4
N− c− X
N
= 0. (6)
The solution of (6) gives a positive root N+ and a negative root N−. d∗ is negative
between the two roots, so ∀N ≤ N+ and positive beyond.
Consequently, for
N ≤ 2(c+
√
c2+X)
d ≤ 0, which is equivalent to a decrease in dues, and for
N ≥ 2(c+
√
c2+X),
d ≥ 0, which is equivalent to an increase in dues.
The considerations above concern the choice of the size of the association. Mem-
bers may have incentives to recruit new members rather than reducing their dues,
which might also mean reducing the scope of the collective action. This may be the
case for the organizations Olson wrote about, which almost always welcome new-
comers (Olson, 1971, p. 59.) Depending on the level of dues and on the structure of
distribution of agents’ incomes, it may be more or less difficult to attract new mem-
bers. Furthermore, when there are criteria for joining an association, this may limit
its accessibility to potential members. Gordon and Babchuk (1959), who studied
these membership criteria, identified the criteria of merit (as in the American So-
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ciological Society, for instance) and the criteria of attributes, such as gender (e.g.
feminist associations), origins or culture (for instance an association of Ukraini-
ans), or simply certain social links between members.
Some associations may, on the contrary, prefer to restrict entry, like the so-called
”status organizations” (Hansmann, 1986), which grant their participants a certain
social status (Gordon and Babchuk, 1959.) In these organizations, the decision of
an individual to join depends not only on the characteristics and the price of the col-
lective good provided, but also on the characteristics of the members. This kind of
association establishes a minimal status level (in social, economic or other terms)
in addition to membership dues. When membership in an organization provides its
members with social status, members may decide to limit the number of newcom-
ers. This is the case described by Olson (1971):
”If the top ”400” were to become the top ”4000”, the benefits to the entrants
would be offset by the losses of old members, who would have traded an exalted
social connection for one that might be only respectable” (Olson, 1971, p. 37.)
In any case, there exists a trade-off between the size of the organization and the
level of dues.
4.2 Coalitions and K-Symmetric Equilibrium
As we have already noted, one can consider a coordinated initiative of a group of K
members deciding collectively to make a symmetric voluntary contribution. Gen-
erally, such coordination is difficult to achieve and the organization costs can be
high. However, as Olson (1971) noted, in some cases an existing group which has
already met the organization costs may facilitate further collective action. More-
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over, he noted that the aptitude of a group to provide a collective good can be partly
explained by its origins and the factors that sustain it.
The idea that pre-existing organizations can facilitate the collective action has also
been suggested by Coleman (1988) in the form of the concept of social capital.
Groups of individuals who desire to contribute more can have various different
origins. Besides a pre-existing organization, it may be founded on kinship links or
shared social and cultural characteristics.
Proposition 5 For any K ≤ N, there exists a K-symmetric unique equilibrium such
that di = dK ∀i ∈ K, and d j = 0 ∀ j ∈ N−K. Moreover, dK is increasing in K, θ ,
and α and decreasing in N, X, and c.
The proof is given in Appendix C.
Example Sign of dK: Let us take an example of association characterized by the
parameters θ = 1, γ = 0, and α = 0.5. Substituting them in (C.6) and resolving
yields two solutions:
K+ = 2
√
Nc+X and
K− =−2
√
Nc+X .
If K ≤ K+, then d ≤ 0, and if K > K+, then d > 0.
K+ is interpreted here as a minimal size of K positive equilibrium. In other words,
it is the minimal size of an internal coalition formed by members to make voluntary
contributions within the limits of their budget constraint.
If, nevertheless K+ > N, we return to a N-symmetric equilibrium with d∗ < 0 cor-
responding to a necessary reduction of compulsory payments.
The propositions 4 and 5 postulate, respectively, that at N-symmetric and K-symmetric
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equilibria, the voluntary contribution decreases with an increase in the external re-
sources X . This result illustrates the effect of crowding out currently highlighted by
the models of ”pure altruism” (Andreoni, 1988), where individuals are interested
in total provision of the public good. As has been shown in a number of theoret-
ical studies, under the ”purely altruistic preferences” assumption, voluntary con-
tributions are completely crowded out by public subsidies (Andreoni, 1988, 1990,
Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002). However, this assumption has been challenged by em-
pirical facts, notably in the nonprofit area (Steinberg, 1987, Andreoni, 1988, 1990,
Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002). The assumption of ”impurely altruistic preferences”
(Andreoni, 1988), according to which individuals derive utility not only from total
provision of the public good, but also from the act of giving, accounts better for
the persistence of voluntary contributions in the presence of public financial sup-
port. Under this assumption, the crowding-out of voluntary contributions is incom-
plete (see for instance Steinberg, 1987.) Moreover, Rose-Ackerman (1986) shows
the possible crowding-in effect of government grants in situations where volun-
tary contributions and grants are not perfect substitutes. However, in her model,
crowding-in effects are only possible under the condition that the government is
able to impose its rules on the organizations it supports concerning the services
they provide.
According to the proposition above, the K agents forming an internal coalition can
contribute an equal amount, at the equilibrium, while others pay only the compul-
sory dues. The voluntary contribution decreasing in N sheds light on the character
of the sharing between the members of the coalition and the rest of the group.
The larger the organization, the heavier the charge supported by the K volunteers.
Moreover, individuals may be averse to sharing a common good among a large
number of people (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973.)
This aversion could result from the homophile preferences often used to explain
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the formation of homogeneous groups of individuals with common features (Co-
hen, 1977.)
Finally, the proposition that voluntary contributions are increasing in θ describes
the positive effects of the attractiveness of the public good on individual incentives
to contribute. This theoretical finding is supported by a number of experimental
studies, where an increase in the parameter of attractiveness leads to an increase in
the mean of voluntary contributions (Hichri, 2004, p. 184.)
4.3 Budget constraint and partial K-symmetric equilibrium
What determines the emergence of homogeneous groups, besides homophily? As
the sociological literature stresses, the size and composition of the population can
also lead to the formation of homogeneous groups. For instance, McPherson and
Lovin (1987) studied the influence of the size and diversity of voluntary associ-
ations on the formation of homophile links between members. They showed that
homophily is not merely a natural tendency of individuals, but that the social struc-
ture can also favor or constrain individual choices. Therefore, among the factors
influencing the internal groups in associations, we should distinguish between con-
strained and freely-chosen homophily.
We shall incorporate this idea into our model in the last section of this chap-
ter, by introducing individual preferences for the subjective quality of the public
good. Here, we introduce some heterogeneity by imposing the budget constraint
that influences agents’ choices. In the case with a budget constraint, and with N-
symmetric equilibrium, it is possible that
∃i ∈ N : wi− c−d∗ < 0.
Now, some members of the association cannot contribute at the optimal level d∗
and their contributions cannot exceed the level of d = wi− c limited by their bud-
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get constraint.
Proposition 6 Given a distribution of revenues, there exists a unique value of K ≤
N and a unique partially K-symmetric equilibrium, such that di = dK ∀i ∈ K =
{k|wk− c−dK ≥ 0} et d j = w j− c ∀ j ∈ (N−K).
The proof is given in Appendix C.
5 Non-symmetric equilibria
In this section, we study the relation between the level of voluntary contributions
and incomes. This relation is founded on the non-constant character of the marginal
contribution of a monetary unit to the individual utility. Taking the individual utility
model based on division of the budget between private consumption and contribu-
tions to the public good, we can consider that the net income of the agent i, or
wi− c−di contributes to her utility in a concave way. Consequently, we can note:
Ui = (wi− c−di)β + θNγ (Nc+
N
∑
j=1
d j +X)α . (7)
5.1 Equilibrium without budget constraint
Proposition 7 Without budget constraint, there exists a unique equilibrium, in which
any agent i fixes her voluntary contribution in such a way that her net income is
brought to the level wi− c−di = w0, where w0 > 0 is a reference level common to
all the agents.
The proof is given in Appendix D.
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Example Let us consider a special case: if α = β , then
w0 =
Ω+X
N+( θNγ )
1
1−α
. (8)
The proposition 7 shows how the agents chose their level of voluntary contribution
at a non-symmetric equilibrium. In fact, in this case, each agent pays a personal-
ized price for the public good. The ability of voluntary organizations to establish
personalized prices (or a system of price discrimination) has already been stressed
in the economic literature (Hansmann, 1981, Ben-Ner, 1986.) According to Ben-
Ner, the non-market interactions between members, (kinship links, neighborhood,
common background), as well as the non-profit distribution constraint, allow these
organizations to reveal demands and to establish personalized prices.
5.2 Budget constraints
We now introduce budget constraints: ∀i ∈ N, di ≥ 0, and di ≤ wi− c. In a solution
under constraint di < 0 becomes di = 0, while di > wi− c becomes di = wi− c.
Nevertheless, di > wi− c⇔ wi− c−w0 > wi− c, and thus ⇔ w0 < 0, which con-
tradicts the previous proposition.
Thus, the constraint di ≥ 0 still remains.
Here, di < 0 if and only if wi < w0 + c, and the set of agents with incomes lower
than w0+ c do not bring voluntary contributions.
Proposition 8 There exists a unique equilibrium under constraint, in which the
richest agents of a sub-group K≤N contribute at such a level that their net incomes
are reduced to a common reference level wi− c−di = w0 > 0 for all the agents in
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K, while the agents from N−K, whose incomes are less than w0+ c, do not make
any voluntary contributions.
For proof see Appendix D.
Example As a special case, take α = β . Then
w0 =
ΩK +X +(N−K)c
K+( θNγ )
1
1−α
. (9)
Remark The result where all the agents are reduced to the same level w0 of net
income is somewhat simplistic. This is due to the fact that in this model, the share
of the initial allocation dedicated to private consumption corresponds to an ho-
mogenous good with a unique technology of consumption. However, in real life,
disposable income is rather devoted partly to differentiated baskets of goods char-
acterized by diversified consumption technologies and partly to savings.
6 Volunteering and subjective quality
Now, let us assume that the agents can contribute to the public good not only money,
but also their time and effort. One can differentiate three main types of theoretical
framework for explaining volunteering: pure public good models, private consump-
tion models and investment models (Ziemek, 2006.) Pure public good models con-
sider that volunteers are motivated exclusively by total provision of the public good.
Private consumption models focus on personal rewards, like social status or simply
a warm glow. Investment models may be considered as a special case of private
consumption model, as volunteering provides certain benefits associated with the
accumulation of human and social capital.
The model we describe below is situated between the ”pure public goods” and
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”private consumption” approaches, as the act of volunteering is not independent
of the characteristics of the public good to which it contributes. We consider that
volunteering provides an additional utility to the one derived from total provision,
as in Steinberg (1987), for instance. Steinberg’s approach, considered as a ”mixed
public-private good approach”, represents a case of an ”impurely altruistic model”
(Andreoni, 1990). The individual utility function includes the public goods pro-
vided through the agent’s individual voluntary contribution, public resources and
the contributions of others. The individual contribution and the other agents’ con-
tributions are complementary when the individual is faced with social comparisons
within her group of reference. When the individual is motivated only by total pro-
vision, her contributions and the contributions of others are perfect substitutes.
In our model, each member i can contribute to the public good by making a non-
monetary contribution of effort noted vi, which is subjective value. This effort al-
lows agents to influence the quality of the public good according to their own pref-
erences. The quality is subjective insofar as it cannot always be evaluated objec-
tively. In other words, the quality of a good (or a service) is subjective when it is
evaluated through individual perceptions rather than standardized measures.
One notable example of the use of subjective quality comes from the field of child
day-care. Here, the measurement of quality is influenced by parents’ preferences
concerning certain service characteristics, making it more subjective than the stan-
dards elaborated by experts. For instance, it may be important to know whether the
provider of the child-care service speaks the same language, shares the same values
or the same religion. This implies that an individual’s perception of quality may dif-
fer not only from others’ perceptions, but also from the more objective evaluations
made by experts using an index of quality (Farquhar, 1993, Moss, 1994.) As Evers
and Riedel (2004) have shown in a German case study, the development of non-
profit child-care centers was mainly driven by the desire of some parents to create
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a service in keeping with certain pedagogical, ideological or religious principles.
Moreover, as Kushman (1979) observed in the United States, nonprofit child-care
centers tend to provide more labor-intensive services, sometimes including parent
participation, than private ones.
We therefore suggest that the members of an association can volunteer in the hope
of influencing the subjective quality of the good or service being provided. In the
field of child care, for instance, the role of volunteers can consist in organizing
activities according to their cultural background or pedagogical convictions. In
the field of the arts, active members can influence programming choices accord-
ing to their personal tastes. Finally, in a charity helping the poor, the more active
volunteers can influence the criteria of eligibility or the order of priority (Rose-
Ackerman, 1986.)
Two aspects must be taken into consideration here:
• the cost of the effort.
By convention we measure effort vi as a fraction of the individual’s disposable
time that is dedicated to the volunteering, or vi ∈ [0,1]. For i, the effort vi repre-
sents an opportunity cost that is proportional to her income. We assume that each
agent i works a length of time 1 to earn an income wi. Thus, the opportunity cost
can be written as viwi.
• the impact on the subjective value of the good.
The subjective value of the public good for the agent i depends both on the total
amount of effort provided by all the volunteers and on the weight of her own
effort as a proportion of the total. The combination of both can differ according
to how ”individualistic” the association is. So agents can attach more or less
value to the public good itself, but they also value their own contributions more
or less highly.
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Thus, the subjective level of effort can be written as follows:
(1−δ )
N
∑
j=1
v j +δvi = (1−δ )v−i+ vi. (10)
where δ is the parameter of ”individualism”. Two extreme cases can be considered:
• δ = 0 leads to ∑Nj=1 v j and expresses a purely collective orientation. In other
words, the effort of a volunteer is added to the sum of efforts provided by other
agents;
• δ = 1 leads to vi and designates a purely individualistic orientation, where the
personal contribution is the only one valued, in spite of the effort provided by
others.
We consider that δ , the so-called parameter of individualism, characterizes the type
of association. Under some conditions, it is possible to link this parameter with the
typology of voluntary associations (see for instance Gordon and Babchuk, 1959),
defining them as ”expressive” or ”instrumental groups”. The main objective of the
first type of association is to provide common activities for their members. The
members are direct beneficiaries of organized activities (for instance a country-
club.) A δ equal to one denotes a purely expressive association, inasmuch as par-
ticipation in its activities provides a direct gratification for the members. On the
contrary, the main function of so-called instrumental associations is directed out-
side the organization. This kind of association aims to create and maintain a norma-
tive condition or a commitment (Gordon and Babchuk, p. 25) and exercises a social
influence. Examples include associations for the defence of the rights of minorities
and the poor, or certain political and religious organizations. The extreme case of
such an association is denoted by a value of δ equal to zero. In other words, it is
assumed that the members are driven by ideological principles or common values,
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rather than the pleasure of participating in a shared activity. In real life, voluntary
associations can accomplish both functions. For example, some associations may
have an expressive function at the local level and an instrumental function at the
national level. Intermediate associations may be situated between the two extreme
cases with a δ more or less close to 0 or to 1.
In our model, we introduce effort into the production function of the public good
by means of a Cobb-Douglas function. The utility of the agent i is now written as:
Ui = wi− c−di−wivi+ θNγ (Nc+
N
∑
j=1
d j +X)α((1−δ )
N
∑
j=1
v j +δvi)β (11)
with α and β ∈]0,1[.
In a standard way, each agent i determines her pecuniary contribution di and her
effort vi so as to maximize her subjective utility Ui, according to her rational ex-
pectations about the levels of voluntary contributions ∑ j 6=i d j = d− j and effort
∑ j 6=i vi = v−i made by the other agents.
Proposition 9 At equilibrium, each agent fixes her levels of voluntary contribution
and effort (di,vi) by attributing to the latter a relative weight depending on her
income. The lower the income, the higher the relative weight of the effort. In other
words, a poorer agent will compensate for her weak monetary contribution by a
greater effort. Moreover, for all the agents, the level of direct effort is an increasing
function of the degree of individualism δ .
For proof see Appendix E.
The model above shows that pecuniary contributions and volunteering can well
be made jointly. This conforms to the stylized facts, whereby monetary donations
and volunteering often come together. Generally, the explanation proposed for this
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phenomenon is that donors need to control the good use of their donations. In this
paper, we put forward the idea that the trade-off between monetary contributions
and volunteering can be based on the desire to influence the quality of the public
output. Moreover, the valuation of the public good becomes socially-based, to the
extent that it depends on the agents’ characteristics (culture, education, ideological
considerations, etc.)
Here, the concept of service assumes particular importance. The outputs of non-
profit organizations are mostly represented by services (Weisbrod, 1977, Hans-
mann, 1980). It can be difficult to evaluate a service when it has both immediate
and long-term impacts, or when the perceptions of its quality differ across individ-
uals. The diversity of criteria by which a service can be appraised influences the
possible trade-off between giving and volunteering. Pecuniary contributions and
volunteering may well influence the characteristics of the service differently. Thus,
agents can contribute both money and effort. Another interesting issue highlighted
in the model is the level of effort provided by an agent as a function increasing in
δ , the parameter of individualism characterizing the association. In other words,
the model predicts that volunteering is likely to be more important in expressive
associations (Gordon and Babchuk, 1959), i.e. those essentially oriented towards
the interests of their members. One conclusion we can draw from this result is that
to attract a greater effort of volunteering, an association should take into account
the personal interests of its volunteers. This can be achieved through awards, such
as public recognition and social status, but also through socialization, dialogue and
communication (Laville and Sainsaulieu, 1997, p. 292).
This result is in keeping with some stylized facts about volunteering at the interna-
tional level in general, and in the United States and France in particular.
At the international level, Salamon et al. (2003) highlight the important role of vol-
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unteers in the field of culture and arts, accounting for a quarter of total volunteering
(p. 24). According to Schervish and Havens (1997), volunteers in the United States
largely benefit from the activities they create. Finally, in France, more than half of
the members of expressive associations (e.g. shared leisure activities, social clubs)
participate at least once a week in the shared activities as organizers, while this fig-
ure is only 34 per cent in the instrumental associations, like those for the defence
of minority interests. Moreover, nearly half of the time dedicated to volunteering
is mobilized in the areas of sport, culture and leisure, which are the biggest con-
sumers of this input (Prouteau and Wolff, 2004.) The results of Prouteau and Wolff
(2004) confirm the hypothesis that in France, at least, volunteering by adults is of-
ten reinforced by specific needs for services (children’s education, for instance).
In an empirical study using U.S. data on married women’s voluntary labor, Carlin
(2001) finds that participation rates are positively related to the number of children.
As Ziemek (2006) shows in a cross-country study, the presence of young children
in a household positively influences the egoism and investment motivation of vol-
unteers.
As regards the effect of income on volunteering, according to (E.3), the level of
effort is a decreasing function of w. In other words, the effort of volunteering is
likely to rise when the wage rate decreases. As empirical support to this finding, we
can cite the inverse relation between voluntary labor and wage rates documented by
Menchik and Weisbrod (1987). In addition, Andreoni et al. (1996) find a relatively
substantial negative effect of the net wage on volunteer hours. However, the effects
of wage rate on volunteering may be sensitive to the type of volunteers’ motivations
or other determinants.
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7 Conclusion
Collective-consumption goods can be provided by voluntary associations. In this
paper, we consider an important feature of these organizations, concerning the is-
sue of personal commitment to a common action. We develop a model of voluntary
association of individuals who are interested in obtaining advantages from the pro-
vision of a common good. At the first step, we consider a set of agents who benefit
from a quantity of a good in a uniform manner. We show the existence of sev-
eral symmetric and non-symmetric equilibria corresponding to the different modes
of emergence of associations identified in the sociological literature (Laville and
Sainsaulieu, 1997). At the N-symmetric equilibrium corresponding to the case of
a ”for-self” association, all the agents are equal in the sense that they all make
a fixed voluntary contribution. Voluntary contributions are crowded out by com-
pulsory payments and by exogenous resources. At the K-symmetric equilibrium,
where one can distinguish between two categories of agents, the ”strong” and the
”weak” ones, only K agents make voluntary contributions. This case corresponds
to the case of an association created ”for others”. Here, the effects of crowding out
are also present. Moreover, the level of voluntary contributions diminishes with the
size of the organization. Both at the N-symmetric and the K-symmetric equilibria,
the amount of voluntary contributions grows with the attractiveness of the public
good.
Then, by introducing a budget constraint, we show the existence of a unique par-
tial K-symmetric equilibrium, in which the K richest agents give an equal amount,
while the others give the rest of their disposable income after dues. When it is
assumed that the net income of the agent enters the utility function in a concave
way, we find that there exists a non-symmetric equilibrium at which all the agents
fix their voluntary contributions in such a way as to make their net disposable in-
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comes equal. Finally, in the same configuration and after re-introducing the budget
constraint, we show the existence of a unique equilibrium at which only the richest
members form an internal coalition to make additional voluntary contributions. The
members of this group inside the association give an amount that makes their net
incomes equal.
At the second step, we introduce the quality of the public good into the basic model.
Here, quality is considered simultaneously as a public and private component of the
good provided, while quantity is generally considered as the only feature of the pub-
lic good. An exception is provided by Ben-Ner (1986), who considers quality as a
public component and quantity as a private component, in the sense that consumers
only buy the quantity they demand. The model presented above is reinforced by a
number of works in the empirical literature concerning the positive relationship be-
tween voluntary contributions and the attractiveness of the public good, incomplete
crowding-out phenomena, the importance of the organization size and its effects
on voluntary contributions, and the positive link between incomes and the level
of voluntary contributions. Moreover, according to the stylized facts, the effort of
volunteering is more important in the organizations oriented towards the direct in-
terest of the members. Thus, the rewards of volunteers are not pecuniary. Rather,
the model proposed above stresses how dialogue, social acknowledgment, and what
some call ”accepted differentiation” (Laville and Sainsaulieu, 1997) are important.
Even if most of the results of the model essentially correspond to the stylized facts,
they can depend on the structure of the model. An important assumption made in
the model is that individuals may desire not only to increase production of the pub-
lic good, but also to influence its quality by volunteering. However, this does not
exclude other possible incentives of volunteers, which are not taken into account
in the model. Moreover, the incentives of volunteers to devote time and effort may
differ, depending on the people and the social context. The degrees of motivation
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of individuals can also be heterogeneous. This heterogeneity of incentives could be
an interesting issue for future works.
Finally, the main contribution of this paper consists in highlighting voluntary asso-
ciation as a group of individuals formed around a common intention. But this does
not exclude that possibility that the members of an association may have their own
aspirations and conceptions of the good or service they want to provide. This idea
is formalized by introducing the concept of subjective quality, according to which
the perceptions of the quality of a good (or service) may well differ across per-
sons. Accepting these differences, what has been called ”accepted differentiation”,
allows the actors to promote a collective action. As Laville and Sainsaulieu (1997)
observed, associative activity is an exercise in social cohesion; it does not exclude
the expression of differences that come together around a shared project. In other
words, as the saying goes, ”people can share the same bed without sharing the same
dreams.”
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APPENDICES
A Proofs of propositions 1 and 2
Let us assume first symmetric voluntary contributions, in other words di = d for
each i, and note c′ = c+d. Now, the equation (2) can be re-written as
f (N) =
1
Nγ
(Nc′+X)α , (A.1)
To make f (N) defined and continuous, let us assume that
Nc′+X ≥ 0,
or that
N ≥−X
c′
= N0. (A.2)
When X < 0 (namely, in the presence of fixed costs), this condition means that the
number of participants must be high enough for the sum of individual contributions
c′ to compensate the fixed cost X .
When X ≥ 0, this condition holds for any value of N ≥ 0.
The derivative of the production function of the public good (2) can be written as
follows:
d f
dN
=
Nc′(α− γ)− γX
Nγ+1(Nc′+X)1−α
. (A.3)
Given (A.2), the sign of the derivative will be the one of the numerator (A.3), or
sg
d f
dN
= sg(Nc′(α− γ)− γX). (A.4)
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(i.) When X ≥ 0, namely in the presence of public subsidies,
• γ ≥ α
d f
dN
≤ 0,∀N. (A.5)
In this case, association does not make sense as the sharing rule described by γ
cancels the gain of individual utility.
• γ < α
The variation of the sign of the derivative is given in the table below.
Table A.1
Variations of the production function with N in the presence of external subsidies
N N1 =− γX(α−γ)c′
d f
dN < 0 0 > 0
Beyond N1, each additional contribution leads to a gain in individual utility.
There is no overcrowding, but there exists a minimal size of association which is
necessary for association to make sense.
(ii.) When X < 0, namely in the presence of fixed costs, two cases need to be
studied:
• If γ ≤ α , the production function is increasing with the number of contributors
if their number is higher than N0. In this case, there is no overcrowding.
Nc′(α− γ)− γX > 0,∀N. (A.6)
Thus,
d f
dN
≥ 0,∀N ≥ −X
c′
= N0. (A.7)
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• If γ > α ,
Nc′(α− γ)− γX = 0 (A.8)
for a number of participants N equal to
N1 =
−γX
(γ−α)c′ . (A.9)
the table of variations of the derivative will be the following:
Table A.2
Variations of the production function with N in the presence of fixed costs
N N1 =− γX(γ−α)c′
d f
dN > 0 0 < 0
Beyond N1, the production function generates overcrowding. In other words,
when the number of participants is higher than N1, the amount of good produced
diminishes with the number of members.
Note that N1 > N0. The number of members N0 represents a minimal size of
association. Beyond this size and up to N1, effects of overcrowding are absent,
namely the production of the public good increases with the number of members.
2
A.1 Extension 1
Now let us suppose that K first members, founders for instance, have fixed the level
of the voluntary contribution, while the newcomers contribute only the compulsory
amount c. For each N ∈ [N0,K], the previous results hold.
32
Beyond this threshold, ∀N > K the production function is written as follows:
f (N) =
1
Nγ
(Nc+Kd+X)α . (A.10)
This situation is equivalent to the previous case with c′ = c and
Y = X +Kd. (A.11)
Thus, the previous results are found with
N0 =−Yc
and
N1 =
γY
(α− γ)c . (A.12)
An important issue here is to situate N1 with regard to K.
If Y ≥ 0 and γ < α ,
N1 =
γY
(α− γ)c ≥ K
if and only if
γY ≥ (α− γ)cK. (A.13)
By substituting (A.11) in (A.13) we obtain
K[c(α− γ)−d]≤ γX . (A.14)
• If the term of the equation (A.14) c(α−γ)−d > 0, i.e. if the compulsory amount
is high enough relative to voluntary contributions, then we obtain
K <
γX
c(α− γ)−d = s. (A.15)
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Therefore we obtain the following table of variations, where two alternative cases
depend on the relative position of K with regard to s.
Table A.3
Position of K relatively to s
N0 s
K N1
d f
dN < 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
K
d f
dN < 0 > 0 > 0
Thus, for a population that is large enough, there is no overcrowding.
• In the case where c(α − γ)− d ≤ 0 and X ≥ 0, the inequality (A.14) holds for
any K ≥ 0 (here we are in the alternative case K ≤ N1).
If X < 0, we find the two alternative cases above.
Finally, if Y < 0, we find the previous results.
A.2 Extension 2
If beyond the number K it is possible to make voluntary contributions, the situation
of every member is improved. Overcrowding remains absent, but it can occur when
Y < 0 and γ > α , beyond a threshold possibly moved forward.
A.3 Extension 3
If below K, the voluntary contributions vary, one can substitute Kd by D=∑Kj=1 d j.
The result still holds.
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B Proofs of proposition 3 and corollary 3.1
B.1 Proof of proposition 3
The utility for the member N is written as
UN = wN − c−dN + θNγ (YN +dN)
α , (B.1)
where
YN = Nc+
N−1
∑
j=1
d j +X . (B.2)
N has an incentive to contribute when
∂UN
∂dN
≥ 0. (B.3)
∂UN
∂dN
=−1+ θα
Nγ
(YN +dN)α−1. (B.4)
Thus, we obtain the following condition:
θα ≥ Nγ(YN +dN)1−α . (B.5)
Therefore, N will have incentives to contribute a positive amount if and only if
θα ≥ Nγ(Nc+
N−1
∑
j=1
d j +X)1−α . (B.6)
The right-hand term is increasing in N.
Then, formation of the internal group is studied in the situation of symmetry. In
other words, here we analyze the situation where a group of individuals in an asso-
ciation each decide to provide an equal amount. This is equivalent to the decision
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to raise the compulsory payment. Now, the initial individual utility is written as
UG0i = wi− c+
θ
Nγ
(Nc+X)α , (B.7)
We study the derivative with regard to c:
∂U
∂c
=−1+θαN1−γ(Nc+X)α−1. (B.8)
Consequently, ∂U∂c ≥ 0 if and only if
θα ≥ (Nc+X)
1−α
N1−γ
. (B.9)
We study the variations of the right-hand side term of (4):
f (N) =
(Nc+X)1−α
N1−γ
(B.10)
∂ f
∂N
=
(Nc+X)−αN−γ
N2(1−γ)
(γNc− (1− γ)X). (B.11)
Consequently,
sg
∂ f
∂N
= sg(γNc− (1− γ)X), (B.12)
and thus, ∂ f∂N ≥ 0 if and only if
N ≥ 1− γ
γ
X
c
. (B.13)
2
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B.2 Proof of corollary 3.1
The level c∗ is obtained from (B.8) as solution of ∂U∂c = 0. It can be written as:
c∗ =
(θα)
1
1−α N
1−γ
1−α −X
N
. (B.14)
Now the variation of c∗ as a function of N can be studied:
∂c∗
∂N
=
(θα)
1
1−α N
1−γ
1−α α−γ
1−α +X
N2
. (B.15)
Given the assumption X ≥ 0 et α > γ ,
∂c∗
∂N
> 0.
2
C Proofs of propositions 4, 5, and 6
C.1 Proof of proposition 4
The utility function in N-symmetric equilibrium can be written as
Ui = wi− c−d+ θNγ (N(c+d)+X)
α , (C.1)
∂Ui
∂d
=−1+θαN1−γ(N(c+d)+X)α−1. (C.2)
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By assuming the right-hand term of (C.2) equal to zero, we obtain the optimal value
of voluntary contribution in N-symmetric equilibrium without budget constraint 1 :
d∗ = (θα)
1
1−α N
α−γ
1−α − c− X
N
. (C.3)
From equation (C.3) follows that d∗ is increasing in θ .
Let us note
d∗ = (λα)
1
1−α
1
N
− c− X
N
,
with
λ = θN1−γ . (C.4)
We study the function f (α) = (λα)
1
1−α avec α < 1.
d f
dα
=
λ
1−α (λα)
α
1−α .
d f
dα > 0, d
∗ is therefore increasing in α .
We now study the variation of d∗ with N:
∂d∗
∂N
= (θα)
1
1−α
α− γ
1−α N
α−γ
1−α−1+
X
N2
> 0.
On the contrary, it follows immediately from (C.3) that d∗ is decreasing in c and in
X . 2
C.2 Proof of proposition 5
At the K-symmetric equilibrium, the utility function is written as follows:
∀i≤ K Ui = wi− c−d+ θNγ (Nc+Kd+X)
α , (C.5)
1 The second order condition holds if X ≥ 0 and α < 1.
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Maximizing (C.5) yields
dK =
(θαKNγ )
1
1−α −Nc−X
K
. (C.6)
From (C.6) it follows that dK is increasing in θ , α , and K and decreasing in N, X ,
and c. 2
C.3 Proof of proposition 6
Let us range the population of agents in the decreasing order of incomes as follows
j > i⇒ w j ≤ wi.
The result is a straightforward consequence of the properties shown by Foray,
Thoron, and Zimmermann (2007) applied to the previous model of equilibrium
with constraints. The distribution of voluntary contributions is presented by the
figure (C.1).
Fig. C.1. The distribution of voluntary contributions
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Now, the individual utility is written for any i ∈ K as follows:
UKi = wi− c−dK +
θ
Nγ
(Nc+KdK +DN−K +X)α , (C.7)
where
DN−K = ∑
j>K
w j− c.
or
UKi = wi− c−dK +
θ
Nγ
(K(c+dK)+ΩN−K +X)α , (C.8)
where
ΩN−K = ∑
j∈(N−K)
w j.
For any i ∈ K,
∂Ui
∂dK
=−1+ θαK
Nγ
(K(c+dK)+ΩN−K +X)α−1. (C.9)
By assuming ∂Ui∂dK = 0, we obtain an optimal value of contributions for any i ∈ K:
dK = [(
θαK
Nγ
)
1
1−α −ΩN−K−X ] 1
K
− c. (C.10)
According to Thoron and Zimmermann (2007), the value of K is adjusted in such
a way, that wk− c≥ dK and wK+1− c < dK . 2
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D Proofs of propositions 7 and 8
D.1 Proof of proposition 7
Now, the first order condition is written as
∂Ui
∂di
=− β
(wi− c−di)1−β
+
θ
Nγ
α
(Nc+∑Nj=1 d j +X)1−α
. (D.1)
The second order condition becomes
∂ 2Ui
∂d2i
=− β (1−β )
(wi− c−di)2−β
− θ
Nγ
α(1−α)
(Nc+∑Nj=1 d j +X)2−α
< 0. (D.2)
The non-constrained equilibrium is obtained by assuming ∂Ui∂di = 0 ∀i ∈ N under
condition
wi− c−di > 0. (D.3)
We obtain therefore
β
(wi− c−di)1−β
=
θ
Nγ
α
(Nc+∑Nj=1 d j +X)1−α
. (D.4)
It follows consequently that ∀i 6= j
β
(wi− c−di)1−β
=
β
(w j− c−d j)1−β
or that ∀i ∈ N, wi− c−di = w0, and thus
di = wi−w0− c. (D.5)
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Thus, after voluntary contribution, all the agents are brought to the same level of
net income w0.
Now, we can write
N
∑
j=1
d j =
N
∑
j=1
w j−N(c+w0) = Ω−N(c+w0),
from which, by substituting in (D.4) we obtain
β
w1−β0
=
θ
Nγ
α
(Ω+X−Nw0)1−α (D.6)
It follows that w0 solution of the implicit equation (D.6) is strictly positive, which
satisfies the condition (D.3). 2
D.2 Proof of proposition 8
As in Foray, Thoron, and Zimmermann (2007), if the N agents are ranged in a de-
creasing order of incomes, there exists a K ≤N satisfying the following conditions:
The individual utility is written ∀i ∈ K
Ui = (wi− c−di)β + θNγ (Nc+
K
∑
j=1
d j +X)α . (D.7)
In the same way as in the proposition 7, ∀i ∈ K
di = wi−w0− c.
However, this time
K
∑
j=1
d j =
K
∑
j=1
w j−K(c+w0) = ΩK−K(c+w0),
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and consequently, w0 is solution of the implicit equation
β
w1−β0
=
θ
Nγ
α
(ΩK +X −Kw0+(N−K)c)1−α . (D.8)
2
E Proof of proposition 9
To simplify the expression of the utility function, let us note w = wi, m = di, M =
Nc+X +d−i, f = vi, F = (1−δ )v−i, z= θNγ etx=wi−c−di. The latter represents
the share of the budget of i available for her private consumption.
Thus, the agent i is solving the following:
MaxU(x,m, f ) = x−w f + z(M+m)α(F + f )β (E.1)
under a budget constraint
x+m+ c−w = 0 (E.2)
Using the Kuhn and Tuker theorem and noting the multiplicator corresponding to
the constraint (E.2) as λ , we write the marginal utilities and the respective first
order conditions (the marginal utilities are proportional to the prices):
∂U
∂x
= 1 = λ px = λ (i)
∂U
∂m
= αz
(F + f )β
(M+m)1−α
= λ pm = λ (ii),
and
∂U
∂ f
= β z
(M+m)α
(F + f )1−β
−w = λ p f = 0. (iii)
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From (i) it follows that λ = 1.
Consequently, the first order conditions (ii) and (iii) can be written as
αz(F + f )β = (M+m)1−α (ii′)
and
β z(M+m)α = w(F + f )1−β (iii′)
By making a cross product of the terms of these equations, we obtain:
αw(F + f ) = β (M+m)
⇔ f = β
αw
(M+m)−F. (E.3)
2
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